В.Кондратьев Самолеты первой мировой войны

ФОККЕР" E.I/E.II/E.III / FOKKER E.I/E.II/E.III
  
   Первый в мире истребитель, оснащенный синхронным оружием, был создан немецким авиаконструктором голландского происхождения Антони Фоккером путем установки пулемета "Парабеллум" на самолет M5K, разработанный на базе французского многоцелевого моноплана "Моран G". Но в отличие от изделий фирмы "Пфальц", M5K не был точной копией "Морана". Он выделялся, прежде всего, конструкцией силового набора фюзеляжа и оперения, который на французской машине был деревянным, а у "Фоккера" - сварным из стальных труб. Кроме того, самолет имел оригинальную тележку шасси.
   Невооруженный M5K выпускался серийно с 1914 года, а в варианте истребителя он совершил первый полет 23 мая 1915 г. В июне самолет приняли на вооружение под обозначением "Фоккер" E.I (E - сокращение от немецкого Eindecker - моноплан) и запустили в серийное производство. Серийные "фоккеры" оснащались 80-сильными ротативными моторами "Оберурсель" и синхронными пулеметами "Парабеллум" или LMG 08. Вариант со 100-сильным "Оберурселем" получил обозначение E.II. Летом 1915 г. На заводе Фоккера в Шверине построено 54 E.I и 59 E.II.
   Вскоре была запущена в серию самая массовая модификация фоккеровского истребителя-моноплана - E.III, отличавшаяся увеличенными геометрическими размерами. На некоторые из них ставили по два синхронных пулемета. Объем производства этих машин составил 260 экземпляров.
   Появление "эйндеккеров" на западном фронте позволило немцам захватить господство в воздухе. Боевые потери английской и французской авиации резко возросли. До конца 1915 г. союзники не имели самолета, способного на равных противостоять этим машинам.
   22 экземпляра E.III было поставлено в Турцию, где на них летали немецкие пилоты, шесть штук - в Австро-Венгрию и три - в Болгарию.
  
  
  
МОДИФИКАЦИИ
  
   E.I; двигатель "Оберурсель" U 0, 80 л.с. ВООРУЖЕНИЕ: 1 синхр. "Парабеллум" или LMG 08/15 "Шпандау".
  
   E.II; двигатель "Оберурсель" U I, 100 л.с.
  
   E.III; увеличен размах крыла и длина фюзеляжа, двигатель тот же. Самая крупносерийная модификация - 270 экземпляров.
  
  
  
ЛЕТНО-ТЕХНИЧЕСКИЕ ХАРАКТЕРИСТИКИ
  
   E.I Е.III
   Размах, м 8,50 9,52
   Длина, м, 6,7 7,3
   Площадь крыла, кв.м 14,00 16,00
   Сухой вес, кг 358 399
   Взлетный вес, кг 563 610
   Скорость максимальная, км/ч 130 140
   Время подъема на высоту
   2000 м, мин.сек 15,0 12,0
   Потолок, м 3000 4100

A.Weyl Fokker: The Creative Years (Putnam)

THE FOKKER FIGHTER AND ITS GUN

   On April 19, 1915, the Morane-Saulnier Type N monoplane flown by Lieutenant Roland Garros was hit by a shot from the rifle of an aged reservist guarding a railway near Courtrai. This chance hit was enough to cut the petrol supply to the engine, and Garros was obliged to land in enemy territory near Ingelmunster. His attempts to burn his aircraft failed, and it was captured intact.
   The machine was fitted with a Hotchkiss machine-gun and the Saulnier armoured airscrew. The Germans realized that they now had in their hands one of the French aeroplanes that had shot down several German machines with an apparently magical device that enabled a fixed machinegun to fire straight ahead through the revolving airscrew.
   Now that the secret was known, the Germans decided to copy it without delay. Hauptmann Foerster was ordered to see whether similarly armoured airscrews could be made. He took Garros’ propeller to Doeberitz, where Simon Brunnhuber quickly made a copy. However, when it was fitted to an engine on a test-bed and subjected to a test firing with a machine-gun, it became painfully obvious that either the steel of the deflecting wedges was not of armour-plate quality or else the German bullets had better armour-piercing capabilities - the airscrew was shattered, the test-bed disintegrated, and the bevy of high-ranking officers watching the test escaped injury by the skin of their teeth. Obviously a more thorough approach would have to be made.
   Foerster next got in touch with Fokker and asked him to come to Doeberitz to study the problem. Fokker was allowed to take back to Schwerin the airscrew from Garros’ monoplane and a brand-new Parabellum air-cooled machine-gun with ammunition. This was just being introduced as the observer’s free-mounted weapon in the C-class armed two-seaters. It fired 100-round belts of standard infantry ammunition (“S” bullets). Quite an event, for an alien, in wartime, to be given the latest type of machine-gun with ammunition.
   It will probably never be known for certain who at Schwerin actually suggested replacing the primitive armouring of the airscrew by a trigger-actuating synchronization linkage that fired the gun once during every revolution of the propeller when neither blade was in the line of fire. Fokker, of course, claimed that he and he alone invented this and told of the pains he took in evolving the actual mechanism. Since all claims by Fokker that he originated inventions or designs are a priori suspect, and can in the majority of cases be proved false, it is highly probable that in the case of the gun-synchronizing mechanism he was not the inventor - especially as he did not have even an elementary knowledge of machineguns and their functioning, and he did not have enough engineering knowledge to devise linkages and so on.
   It is highly probable that Heinrich Luebbe, Fokker’s close collaborator in this development, conceived the idea and executed it. Luebbe was a watchmaker by profession, but he understood guns and later became one of the leading specialists on aircraft weapons in Germany. He was certainly the designer of a later synchronizing gear also attributed to Fokker.
   The advantages of a synchronizing mechanism were fairly obvious: the airscrew could retain its efficient shape; the airscrew shaft was not subjected to irregular flexural hammering by bullets striking the deflector plates; no ammunition was wasted; and the rate of fire could be high.
   The synchronizing mechanism that was evolved at Schwerin, chiefly by Luebbe, Heber and Leimberger, was similar in principle to Franz Schneider’s gear. It consisted of a simple linkage of cams and push-rods between the oil-pump drive of the Oberursel and the gun trigger, and was called Stangensteuerung (push-rod control). It was mounted on an improvised firing stand and tested till it worked; it then required only a means of starting and stopping it at will, and this was designed and embodied in the mechanism.
   A full-scale installation of the gun and synchronizing mechanism was made on a Fokker M.5K (Factory No. 216) incorporating cases for the full and empty ammunition belts, and feed guides connecting these cases with the gun. The welded construction of the fuselage greatly simplified the conversion: all brackets and attachments could easily be welded on where they were wanted. To assist in the adjustment of the mechanism the airscrew was replaced by a plywood disc on which the outline of the propeller was drawn. When properly adjusted, a trial was made with an actual airscrew. The converted M.5K with its gun was flown briefly by Fokker and seemed to work well. The aircraft was then redesignated M.5K/MG.
   Day and night work by his team enabled Fokker to return to Doeberitz, only a few days after his invitation to go there, complete with an armed fighter prototype. He announced with pride that he had come to demonstrate a much better fighter than the Morane-Saulnier, and proceeded to do so.
   At first, none of the witnesses seemed to understand why the airscrew remained undamaged after the gun had been fired, for no armour protection of any kind could be seen on the blades. Fokker explained the Stangensteuerung mechanism and demonstrated it in action. Everyone present, especially Oblt. W. von Buttlar, then in charge of armament development, was considerably impressed. Staff officers from the front who had urged the immediate adoption of Saulnier’s armoured propeller were highly gratified to see that something better had been found. They now pressed for an early demonstration of the aircraft at GHQ before the Feldflugchef, and for operational trials. Fokker promised full co-operation,
   All the firing trials and the demonstration at Doeberitz had been made with the light Parabellum machine-gun type MG.14, of D.W.M. design, developed in November 1914 for the armament of the C-type two-seaters. Its installation on the Fokker M.5K had been a rather hasty one. Some thought had been given to sighting; and an adjustable head-rest had been fitted to ensure that the pilot’s head was in the correct position when aiming the whole aircraft. The gun was fired by pressing a push-button mounted between the two handles of the control grip beneath the blip-switch.
   The original M.5K/MG, thus armed, had no military designation but was later given the military order number E.1/15. It was later modified to have the LMG.08 machine-gun in place of the Parabellum and, after being a spare aircraft at the front, it was used for instructional purposes at the Fokker school and was still flying in the autumn of 1917.
   The military authorities adapted the slightly heavier but more reliable air-cooled version of the MG.08 gun for operational use in aircraft; it was a direct development of the original Maxim gun. Designated LMG.08, the aircraft gun was a design of the Royal Rifle Factory at Spandau (hence the all-too-often misnamed Spandau guns - there was no such German weapon designation). Having no stock, it had a longer barrel for equal weapon length; it could fire up to about 600 rounds per minute; and it was easier to instal than the Parabellum.
   The first installation of the LMG.08 was made in the Fokker M.5K whose factory number was 258, and guns of this type were fitted to the first two single-seat fighters Fok. E.2/15 and Fok. E.3/15 that Fokker took to the Western Front a week or two later. Until April 1916 all German single-seat fighters were armed with the LMG.08; from May 1916 all fixed guns in German aeroplanes were of the type LMG.08/15, an improved design that was not only lighter but could fire up to 800 rounds per minute. When the gun was synchronized the rate of fire was appreciably reduced. This was particularly the case with the original form of the Stangensteuerung, in which the trigger was pulled only once during every revolution of the propeller. Later improvements to the mechanism doubled the possible rate of fire.
   At the request of the Feldflugchef an order for forty or fifty Fok. E.Is was placed immediately by the IdFlieg. Fokker was asked to build them as quickly as possible; if he could not produce the aircraft quickly, manufacture under licence by another firm would be arranged. Fokker was also asked to go to selected aerodromes at the front to demonstrate his fighter and instruct inexperienced pilots and mechanics in the handling of the aircraft and its armament. On this tour Fokker took with him the first two Fok. E.Is of the batch under construction and probably also an unarmed M.5 or M.8 trainer.
   On May 23, 1915, he gave a successful demonstration of flying and air firing before the German Crown Prince at Stenay. Among the officers who received their initiation on the Fok. E.I at Stenay was Leut. Otto Parschau. His earlier experience with the M.5 and Fokker A enabled him to master the new type quickly and naturally, and he flew it so well that he accompanied Fokker during the rest of the instructional tour, giving exhibition flights and demonstrations.
   The Fok. E.I, like the M.5, could accommodate a slim passenger immediately behind the pilot, and Fokker was able to take up aspiring fighter pilots. They could thus get the feel of the aircraft and see how the engine and gun should be handled. The Feldflugchef had confirmed that only pilots with experience on rotary-powered monoplanes should be allowed to fly Fokker monoplanes right away: all others had to take the Schwerin course. As with all such rules in the German military organization, however, there were exceptions.
   From Stenay Fokker was sent to Douai at the request of Major F. Stempel, Flying Corps staff officer at the H.Q. of the 6th Army, where the German position in the air fighting over the Arras sector had become precarious. Fokker and Leut. Parschau arrived there with their two E.Is early in June 1915. At and around Douai were a number of Feldfliegerabteilungen, including the recently formed but already famous Fl. Abt. 62 under Hauptmann H. Kastner; among the pilots were Leutnant Oswald Boelcke and Fahnrich (later Leut.) Max Immelmann, who had had combat experience on armed two-seaters. Also at Douai was Brieftauben-Abteilung-Metz which was being re-equipped with armed C-types and flying defensive patrols.
   The primary reason for sending Fokker into the Verdun and Arras areas was in fact to familiarize the B.A.O. and B.A.M. formations with the use of the Fok. E.I as an offensive weapon, since both units were being reformed as combat wings. Indeed, the first pilots to receive the Fok. E.I were from B.A.O. and B.A.M. Single E.Is were allocated to a few Feldfliegerabteilungen in areas where Allied aircraft held command of the air to act as escorts for unarmed two-seaters. It was intended to issue Fokkers for this purpose to all similar units.
   Fokker left Douai on July 12, 1915. By that time, eleven German pilots were operating Fokker fighters on the Western Front; there were none on any other front at that time. Boelcke got his E.3/15 about a week before Fokker’s departure.
   Some comment should be made on Fokker’s improbable story, related in his autobiography, of his exploits as a “German fighter pilot”. His assertion that he was at any time ordered to stalk and shoot down an enemy aircraft to prove the effectiveness of his invention strains credulity to the limit. If, as he avers, he “nearly” did so, only refraining from committing murder because of “twinges of conscience”, then he must have planned such an exploit entirely on his own. No German officer of any responsibility would or could have ordered a civilian - and a foreigner at that, from a country not much in sympathy with Germany - to go and shoot down an enemy soldier. Such a preposterous order, or even mere suggestion, would have been entirely contrary to fundamental German conceptions of discipline and traditions of honour. An officer giving such an order, or permitting'such a violation of military decency and of the Geneva Convention, would have been cashiered immediately, if not committed to prison by court martial.
   Fokker certainly wore German uniform at one time, thanks to Oblt. Bruno Loerzer, who lent him the attire. This was done as a measure of protection to Fokker: the Oberursel was unreliable, and so was Fokker’s navigation. If he were to fall into the hands of the Feldpolizei (Field Police), these tough characters might have become highly suspicious of the pilot of a German military aircraft who was dressed in civilian clothes and by his accent might have been a Belgian of Flemish nationality. The Feldpolizei rarely had the luck or the skill to catch a spy, and it might have required some high-level intervention to secure Fokker s release from their grasp.
   Fokker’s fanciful account can impress only those who know nothing of the discipline and fanatical pride of officers of the German Flying Corps.

   The production Fokker E.I differed in some ways from the Parabellum-armed M.5K/MG No. 216 that Fokker had demonstrated at Doeberitz after brief trials of the synchronizing gear. The other M.5K monoplanes that were converted into fighters were also designated M.5K/MG, but all had the LMG.08 gun in a cleaned-up installation and were to all intents and purposes Fok. E.Is.
   It is not possible to determine whether the M.5 fuselage was modified for production as the E.I. No drawings or specifications are available, possibly because they never existed; the E.I never underwent a proper type test, so urgent was the demand from the front, but a few strength tests were made at Adlershof at a later date. It therefore seems reasonable to assume that such modifications as were made were confined to the armament installation.
   The Fokker E.I retained the bench-type seat, so that a passenger could be squeezed in close behind the pilot. Boelcke made use of it to give joy-rides and occasionally to give pilots unaccustomed to Fokkers an introduction to the type, but it was not used in the Kampf-Einsitzer-Schulen: the extra weight of a passenger lengthened the take-off run considerably and the climb was poor. Some batches of Fokker E types (but not the naval versions) had bucket seats with fore-and-aft adjustment.
   Operational use of the M.5 had shown that direct downward vision was needed. The usual wing-root apertures impaired the climb and were not too satisfactory, so it was suggested that a flap should be provided in the cockpit floor, opened by a lever. Fokker adopted the device and it was embodied in all Fokker E types.
   The Fok. E.I carried 70 litres (16 gals.) petrol, sufficient for a maximum endurance of two hours, and 16 litres (3.5 gals.) of oil. This was a considerable load, for the Oberursel engine had a voracious appetite. The Service originally wanted to specify longer flight endurance because they wanted the aircraft as an escort fighter to protect the two-seaters, which could carry fuel for up to four hours. The position of the ammunition boxes precluded any enlargement of the gravity tank behind the engine: indeed, the reverse would have been desirable. A large additional tank was therefore fitted behind the cockpit. It was also some way behind the centre of gravity and, when full, made its presence felt during the take-off. Once in the air, however, it did not noticeably affect the aircraft’s handling qualities.
   Different petrol-feed systems were fitted to various versions of the Fokker E types. Aircraft for the Navy had a hand pump to pressurize the rear tank in order to transfer the petrol to the gravity tank; control was by means of a three-way fuel cock. This simple system was extensively used in German two-seat aircraft of the time. It was frequently augmented by a small engine-driven air pump, a relief valve being fitted to the tank to reduce excess pressure. An earlier pressurization system using cooled exhaust gas had proved unreliable because soot in the exhaust tended to clog the relief valve, with unpleasant consequences.
   However, most of the Fokker E aeroplanes had an automatic petrol feed between the rear and gravity tanks. These aircraft had a small windmill-driven pump, which was mounted on the starboard front V-strut of the undercarriage within the slipstream. The pump feed was safer than pressure feed, for the engine was sensitive to variations in pressure, and an over-rich mixture would cause it to stop. This method of fuel transfer by direct pumping, without pressurization, seems to have been first employed on the French R.E.P. monoplane of the pre-war period, some specimens of which had been captured by the Germans. A similar system, designed by F. Schneider, was fitted on L.V.G. biplanes.
   The original armament installation had been hastily made and was heavy. It was progressively modified and improved, the modifications being embodied as they were devised, consequently gun installations varied in detail. The more fundamental modifications were necessitated by the Fokker team’s lack of experience with weapons of any kind. They underestimated the hammering effect of the recoil force, and the fact that a hot charge would produce a multiple of the gas pressure. Blast effect dictated the addition of reinforcing strips to the top of the engine cowling. The gun was mounted centrally on most Fokker monoplanes, but some pilots wanted it offset to starboard. Boelcke insisted that the gun should be aligned with its barrel axis parallel to the upper longerons of the fuselage. Immelmann, on the other hand, urged Fokker to instal guns with 15 degrees upward elevation to facilitate attacks on two-seaters from below and behind, and the guns of the Fok. E.IV were originally mounted at this angle. Boelcke found that Immelmann’s idea, though good in theory, was unsatisfactory in practice. He pointed out that aiming would always be inaccurate unless fire was always opened at a fixed distance. It had not been realized that firing ranges in aerial combat were usually so short that the drop in trajectory mattered little.
   Many Fokker E types, even up to the Fok. E.IV, retained the tripod head-rest that Fokker had devised for the first experimental aircraft to ensure correct alignment on the target. Most of the successful veteran fighter pilots, Boelcke and Immelmann included, never used the headrest, but preferred the ring-and-bead sight. Other pilots preferred rectangular frame sights, but these were not fitted to later fighters and the ring-and-bead sight was standardized.
   Many unofficial modifications to sights, cartridge feed, gun adjustment, and so on, were made in the field, but were neither adopted by Fokker nor approved by the technical authorities of the Flying Corps. At Schwerin much experimental work was done by Luebbe with the assistance of Heber and Leimberger, and valuable experience and information were acquired. But complaints continually came from the front that the gun itself and its synchronizing mechanism were giving trouble in combat. Had the gun and its synchronizer been of 1918 quality the Allies would probably have suffered three times as many losses as they did.
   The Fok. E.I wing structure was basically that of the M.5K. Minor modifications suggested by operational experience were embodied but the main features were unchanged. The Fok. E.I wing had ash spars. Ash was scarce and spruce was unobtainable in Germany after the end of 1914, so later E types had a front spar of Polish pine, which was plentiful. The spars were not laminated, but were spindled out on a routing machine.
   The poplar ribs were similar to those of all earlier Fokker monoplanes after the M.2 and were of the characteristic Fokker aerofoil section. The steel-tube compression struts were attached to the spars by ball-and-socket fittings that permitted the wing to flex when warped. The wing warping was not unduly stiff in operation, and the Fokker monoplanes were not regarded as tiring to fly, even in gusty weather. For the internal bracing, piano wire with plain end loops and ferrules was used, and was stronger than that of the M.5K.
   The wing-tip formers, which were thin enough to flex when the wing was warped, were bent from ash laths in simple jigs. The raked tips were more rounded than those of the M.5K prototype. A narrow walkway of plywood was provided on each wing close to the fuselage, and the compass was housed in the starboard wing. This was done in an attempt to keep the compass as far as possible from the steel fuselage but even so it was still erratic. German aeronautical compasses were considerably inferior to British instruments.
   Recessed attachment points in the fuselage accommodated the plain end fittings of the spars, the connexions being made by bolts lying in the line of flight, thus permitting some up-and-down movement of the wings. Like all Fokker aeroplanes, the E.I could be easily assembled, dismantled and transported by road, a characteristic that was always highly valued at the front.
   The front bulkhead of the fuselage carried a circular ring frame to which the engine cowling was attached. The standard cowling, shaped and welded from aluminium sheet, retained the Morane-Saulnier shape. It was held in place by a wire loop attached to lugs welded to the lower longerons. The aluminium side panels extended farther aft than those of the M.5, providing better protection against the Oberursel’s fiery reaction to over-priming or after long glides without petrol adjustment.
   Both tanks were, like those of the M.5, cylindrical; the gravity tank had a division for castor oil. Both tanks were of soldered brass sheet - a disadvantage, as tin was becoming scarce and the Services had rejected welded aluminium tanks, which had proved to be unreliable.
   The box containing the ammunition belt was installed just above the pilot’s knees; the rear-facing door served as a map case. The spent cartridges were jettisoned through a chute, the empty hemp belt being recovered by the pull of a spring-loaded drum. The latter device was a necessity, for Boelcke had had trouble with a loose belt end that had blown into the elevator. Full belts were loaded from the cockpit.
   To the hand-grip on the control column was added a key lever for firing the machine-gun. It was fitted between the two handles, below the press-button of the blip-switch.
   The cockpit equipment was spartan in its simplicity, and there was no dashboard for instruments, its place being filled by the ammunition box. Air-speed indicators were not regulation equipment; indeed, few pilots wanted them. By way of a revolution counter there was usually a sight glass, fitted on the starboard side near the petrol cocks; this also indicated oil flow. An altimeter and a fuel contents gauge completed the instrumentation.
   In all versions of the Fok. E the pilot sat rather high. He therefore had a good field of vision but at altitude and in cold weather he was cold. In the event of overturning on landing he was tolerably well protected in spite of his high seat: he usually had time to duck down inside the cockpit before the aircraft turned over.
   It was not until October 1916, eighteen months after the introduction of the Fok. E.I, that component weights and strengths were established at Adlershof. Fok. E.63/15 was subjected to a technical investigation, and proof loadings confirmed that its strength was adequate.
   Details of performance are scanty, however. Until late in 1918 the Germans made no serious attempt to determine the speeds of their aircraft: it was held that there was no reliable method of determining level speed at altitude: a development of photo-theodolite procedure with variometer recording was regarded as too crude. Speeds were therefore assessed relatively by racing two aeroplanes over a known course. The Fokker E.I was tested against one of the fastest aircraft of the period, a Rumpler C.I (160-h.p. Mercedes), which was a two-seat, two-bay biplane. To everyone’s surprise, the Rumpler gained on the Fokker. A top speed of 130 km. per hr. (80 m.p.h.) near sea level is usually quoted for the Fok. E.I, and this was probably not far from the truth.
   More attention was paid to determining climbing performance. Each individual aeroplane was required to climb to certain altitudes in stipulated times before it was accepted; its load was specified and checked; a sealed barograph (later two) had to be carried in a place inaccessible to the crew in flight, its installation and removal being performed by the Flying Corps officer who witnessed the acceptance document.
   The more unscrupulous German aircraft manufacturers circumvented some of the requirements: for example, an inflated bladder inside the petrol tank enabled an aircraft to be tested with “full” tanks but much reduced weight. With great ingenuity one Johannisthal firm got rid of whole batches of inferior two seaters by replacing the officially supplied barograph paper by similar paper printed with reduced ordinates that concealed the poor climbing performance of their products.
   Small wonder, then, that front-line units often complained bitterly that they were provided with aeroplanes that were quite incapable of climbing to specified altitudes with their war load. The IdFlieg and their Adlershof acolytes kept on pretending that their acceptance procedure was sound and that their Bauaufsichten (Resident Technical Officers at firms) were thoroughly competent and honest.
   But there is little reason to think that such shady practices were resorted to in the acceptance tests of Fokker single-seaters. De Waal was responsible for such tests and he was not a man who would be a party to deceptions of this kind. When a Fokker’s climbing performance was poor it was the fault of the Oberursel.
   The Oberursel was a source of frequent complaints. A particular annoyance was the fact that the qualities of engines of the same batch differed greatly, a reflection on the inefficiency of production control at the Oberursel Works.
   Oblt. Kastner was one of the first pilots to fly offensive patrols as well as escort duties with the Fok. E.I; he also induced Boelcke and, later, Immelmann to continue these operations. At Fl. Abt. 62 Fokker selected. Leut. Boelcke for tuition. When Fokker departed after a stay of about two weeks he left one of his demonstration aircraft (E.3/15) with Boelcke. Apart from his successful combat use of the Fokker, Boelcke made good use of its passenger-carrying capability to give brother officers, mechanics and pretty nurses their baptism of flying in a single-seat fighter.
   Immelmann did not wish to leave the front for conversion training at Schwerin, so he persuaded his Commanding Officer, Kastner, to allow him to try the Fok. E.I after instruction by Boelcke. After a few solos on an unarmed training monoplane (possibly an M.8) on July 30, 1915, Immelmann tried the E.I next day, fired 30 rounds at a ground target and landed successfully. On his next flight in this aircraft (probably E.3/15) on August 1, 1915, he attacked a British aircraft that was bombing Douai aerodrome, wounded the pilot and obliged him to land. This was the first victory in aerial combat won by a Fokker monoplane. It heralded a period of success for the German Flying Corps.
   It has already been indicated that neither Immelmann nor Boelcke was the first to fly the Fok. E.I operationally: five or six pilots, all more experienced than Immelmann, had been doing so since mid-June. Until Immelmann’s victory, however, the Fokkers had been used only for defensive patrols and escort work that had given no opportunity for combat. Immelmann’s successful use of the Fokker more or less as an interceptor led the German authorities to believe that the new fighters would be more usefully employed as hunters. Major Stempel developed the idea by suggesting that small units of the single-seaters should be temporarily formed in areas where air superiority was urgently needed: this offered the hope of more successes than the allocation of single Fokkers to reconnaissance and artillery-observation squadrons. As a result of Stempel’s suggestion the first Kampf-Einsitzer Kommando (K.E.K.) or Single-seat fighter Command was formed under Immelmann, and two more were formed soon afterwards from the single Fokker E.Is of various Feldfliegerabteilungen.
   In the Verdun area, where Major Haehnelt was Stabsoffizier der Flieger (Staff Officer for Aviation, abbreviated as StoFl.), Fokker Commands were also set up soon afterwards. Unfortunately these temporary concentrations of three Fokker E.Is were still under the orders of the Feldfliegerabteilungen that provided the aircraft. Boelcke, who was given command of the K.E.K. at Sivry, urged that the fighter units should be stationed at airfields nearer the fighting lines than those of the ordinary Abteilungen. The Fokker Commands organized their own aircraft intelligence service to eliminate hunting without the certainty of meeting enemy aircraft. This was the beginning of Jagdstaffel development; i.e., of independent units equipped with single-seaters and having as their sole task the attacking of all kinds of enemy aircraft and observation balloons. Nevertheless, the German conception of the tactical use of fighter units was a long way behind the ideas propounded by the French Commandant de Rose, and remained so throughout the war.
   Although the Fok. E.I had its imperfections it had a tonic effect at the front. The infantry in the trenches became aware that enemy aircraft were increasingly denied the air above the battlefield, and the ground troops were far more impressed by a Fokker’s head-on attack than by the manoeuvring, however skilful, of the C-type two-seaters to bring their observers’ guns to bear.
   The Allies discovered to their discomfiture that the sky over German territory had become increasingly inaccessible and that heavy losses attended their attempts to penetrate it. Few Allied aircraft that crossed the lines returned without having been attacked by aeroplanes of seemingly superior performance, fitted with menacingly efficient armament.
   Such encounters with the Fokker fighters led to tales of miraculous aircraft flown by super pilots. These stories grossly exaggerated the modest qualities of the Fokker single-seaters, but some sections of the Allied press seemed to like to make its readers shudder, and sensational reports of mysterious invincible weapons sponsored by the Kaiser were splendid “news”. Like all similar exaggerations, these stories were gleefully welcomed on the German side, for it was obvious that they undermined Allied morale.
   During October-November 1915 a maximum of 26 Fokker fighters were in operational use in the west; about four were sent to the Eastern Front to be flown by selected officers. The pilots who flew them were anything but wonder-men. With few exceptions they had been selected because they knew how to handle rotary engines and had flown light monoplanes. Very few of them had previous experience in air combat, such as Boelcke had; none had any training at all in air-fighting or in firing a machine-gun in the air. They had all flown two-seaters on reconnaissance or artillery-spotting duties; a few had experience in bombing; most of them had never flown an armed aeroplane before. And this was the material from which the successful Fokker pilots were formed: these were the men who tried to discover the rules of air-combat by - literally - hit-and-miss methods.
   Parschau, the first to get a Fok. E.I for service at the front, and Kastner, W. von Buttlar, B. Wentscher, Walz and others, had flown the Fokker M.5 before the war and had flown the Fok. A operationally. Boelcke trained himself to fly the Fok. A and used it in the field. Buddecke had taught himself to fly on a Nieuport monoplane with a Gnome engine in the U.S.A, before the outbreak of war. Hoehndorf had had flying tuition in the Morane-Saulnier school at Villacoublay in France. Immelmann had been initiated by Boelcke on a Fokker two-seater; as he was an exceptionally gifted pilot, this rather sketchy tuition had been sufficient. Others, like Mulzer, Wintgens and B. Loerzer had been through a conversion course at Schwerin. Kurt Student had a day or two’s conversion flying at Mannheim. Ernst Udet had been taught to fly rotary-engined aircraft at a base aviation park, but had smashed a Fok. E on his first flight, and it was only by some previous air-combat experience that he was saved from being grounded. Manfred von Richthofen had been sent back to fly two-seaters after crashing a Fokker monoplane.
   The successes of Immelmann, Boelcke, Parschau, Buddecke, von Althaus, Hoehndorf, Berthold, Walz, Wintgens, Leflers, Notzke, Franke, Mulzer, Kissenberth, Udet and others, provided ample proof of the quality of the little monoplanes in the hands of skilled pilots. By the end of 1915 British losses of aircraft, pilots and observers had become heavy. During the whole month of July 1915, the R.F.C. recorded a total of forty-six air combats: in December 1915 the same number was reported during a single day of aerial operations. On January 12, 1916, four aircraft were lost with eight officers; others returned damaged and with injured crews.
On January 14, 1916, an order was issued from Flying Corps headquarters:
   “Until the Royal Flying Corps are in possession of a machine as good as or better than the German Fokker it seems that a change in the tactics employed becomes necessary. It is hoped very shortly to obtain a machine which will be able to successfully engage the Fokkers at present in use by the Germans. In the meantime, it must be laid down as a hard and fast rule that a machine proceeding on reconnaissance must be escorted by at least three other fighting machines. These machines must fly in close formation and a reconnaissance should not be continued if any of the machines becomes detached. This should apply to both short and distant reconnaissances. Aeroplanes proceeding on photographic duty any considerable distance east of the line should be similarly escorted. From recent experience it seems that the Germans are now employing their aeroplanes in groups of three or four, and these numbers are frequently encountered by our aeroplanes. Flying in close formation must be practised by all pilots.”
   This order may have been inspired by the success of No. 3 Squadron R.F.C. in December 1915. On the 15th, Immelmann shot down near Valenciennes the Morane-Saulnier LA parasol monoplane No. 5087 flown by Lts. Hobbs and Johnston of No. 3 Squadron. Four days later the squadron sent three Moranes on the Valenciennes reconnaissance, two of them acting as escorts to the third. The formation was attacked, unsuccessfully, by Immelmann and by two other German aircraft.
   Immelmann concluded that two or more Fokkers were required for attacks on formations, to break them up and permit attacks on the individual aircraft. Boelcke had come to the same conclusion somewhat earlier when flying in the Verdun sector, where 200 German aeroplanes, including B.A.M. and B.A.O., had been massed for an all-out offensive against the cream of the French Army.
   The opportunity to test the idea was soon provided, for it was at about that time that the Fokker K.E.K. were established. As already noted Boelcke’s was at Sivry, only six miles behind the fighting lines.
   British losses continued, and during March 1916 the R.F.C. lost fourteen aircraft in fights with Fokkers. In Parliament pointed questions were asked, notably by Mr. Joynson-Hicks and Mr. Pemberton-Billing, about the depredations of the Fokkers; the Press contained dark hints about “treason in high places”. In the Daily Chronicle of January 21, 1916, Mr. Philip Gibbs wrote cautiously that the Fokkers were a grave menace indeed; they were deadly fighters, faster than any British aircraft - “the idea that we have nothing equal appears ... to be supported by the number of casualties. ...” The censor let this report from the front pass.
   In June 1916 the critics of the British air effort succeeded in forcing a public enquiry. This did nothing to help shoo the Fokkers away - they had meantime become quite outdated anyway - but it helped to clear the air and eliminate some of the dead wood in the British organization.
   The French, like their British allies, soon found themselves hounded from the sky as soon as they approached the front: their Maurice Farman and Caudron biplanes were virtually defenceless against the Fokkers. On August 2, 1915, a French bombing attack on Saarbrucken proved a disastrous failure: nine aircraft were shot down by the Fokkers, and as a consequence the French bombing squadron formed at Malzeville for strategic attacks on German industrial centres was disbanded.
   Like the R.F.C., the French resorted to formation flying, but with the difference that their formations were of single-seat fighting scouts. They went much further, in fact, for they re-equipped and amalgamated fifteen escadrilles to form the first fighter wing of single-seaters, under Commandant de Rose. De Rose introduced formation offensive patrols of three or four aircraft. The wing was equipped with the new Nieuport Bebe sesquiplane which was inferior to the Fok. E in its armament but had a far better performance and unequalled manoeuvrability. This more formidable opposition was yet another reason why the Fokkers had to operate in small formations. They had to take their French adversaries more seriously from that time onward.
   In the R.F.C. the D.H.2 helped to restore the balance, more by virtue of superior performance than any other quality, for its armament, like the Nieuport’s, was inferior to that of the Fokker.
   The Germans helped to ease the lot of British and French aviators, early in 1916, by their mistaken belief that the air over an area of intense ground operations or preparation for an offensive could be denied to an enemy. Before and during their Verdun offensive of February 21, 1916, the Germans maintained standing patrols of armed two-seaters and singleseat fighters in given sectors. Thus, nearly half as many machine-guns were airborne in German aircraft as were used on the ground. Maintaining the air barricade meant that the 72 armed two-seaters employed on it were not available for other duties: thus the only French supply line to the Verdun fortress escaped bombing, a single road between Bar-le-Duc and Verdun that carried 8,000 lorries daily. This omission frustrated the German offensive: the idea of an aerial blockade had caused the miscarriage of a serious thrust. Nevertheless, the mistake was repeated on the Somme.
   The Allies made much of the fact that Fokker pilots seldom crossed the fighting lines. It was not want of courage that prompted this caution: they had been ordered not to fly over enemy-held territory. The German command did not wish the Fokker synchronizing gear to fall into Allied hands, and the unreliability of the Oberursel was well known. Immelmann, Boelcke and a few others often disobeyed the order; as long as all went well, their superiors turned a blind eye. Success in daring attacks was always an acceptable excuse for disobedience in the German Army; failure might have resulted in a court martial.
   For tactical reasons, too, the Fokkers stayed on their own side of the lines. It was the official German view that it was more important to deny the enemy access to the air over German territory than to try to shoot down great numbers of enemy aircraft. German fighter pilots were therefore instructed to attack enemy two-seaters and bombers and to ignore single-seat fighters as far as possible. In a memorandum written in the summer of 1916, Boelcke laid down that a fighter pilot should not visualize himself as an individual nor seek personal success: his first duty was to act strictly in accordance with military thought and exclusively in the interests of the tactical situation or of the needs of the ground troops.
   The “lack of offensive spirit” displayed by Fokker pilots in combat engagements was often misrepresented. It is explained by a study of combat reports, which reveal that the guns malfunctioned more often than they fired properly. The LMG.08 had been developed by gun specialists who knew nothing of conditions of air combat and were too arrogant to accept the advice and co-operation offered by the IdFlieg. The hemp belt would freeze above 9,000 ft., or in winter after absorbing moisture. The lubricating grease in the gun mechanism froze. Hang-fire rounds were a not-infrequent hazard. The early push-rod synchronizing gear was unreliable: the gun could be fired only at normal engine speeds; at slow speeds the gear linkage worked erratically. The impulse-transmission push-rod contracted in cold weather; the effect could be quite pronounced, for the trigger movement was small.
   This explains why Fokker pilots were frequently obliged to break off engagements quickly. When his gun jammed, the Fokker pilot needed both hands to clear it and reload. While thus occupied he could not control the aircraft: he had to hold the stick between his knees, or, in later Fokker monoplanes, he applied the elevator locking device for the same purpose; in either case he had to turn away from the enemy and break off the engagement.
   The somewhat makeshift Fok. E.I was rather heavy: a comparison with the Pfalz E.I proved this. From the front came urgent appeals for an aeroplane of better performance that could match the Nieuport single-seater in speed and climb. Greater reliability of armament and engine was also sorely needed: too many combats had to be broken off because the gun jammed, and the Oberursel’s erratic behaviour did nothing to inspire confidence. The authorities had urged the Oberursel works to hasten the production of a 100-h.p. nine-cylinder engine, which was to be supplied to Fokker for use in an improved fighter.
   To redesign was essential. Kreutzer did this without making major changes in the basic design. The new aircraft was designed for the 100-h.p. Oberursel. This necessitated little modification of the engine mounting, but the undercarriage wheels had to be moved forward a few inches to reduce the tendency to nose over. This in turn required some modification of the forward cable attachment to keep the cables clear of the wheels. Despite the heavier engine the seat did not have to be moved, for the supplementary fuel tank placed the centre of gravity rather far aft on the Fok. E.I, even with the heavy gun. The tank had now to be made even larger. The top decking was slightly reduced in height; this permitted an improved gun installation and made sighting easier.
   A small triangular fin was added under the stern of the fuselage to counteract swing at take-off. On operational aircraft, however, the fin was often removed, probably because it collected mud and stones while taxying. For the same reason some Fokker E monoplanes had the bottom of the rudder cut off close to the tailskid. To reduce drag the upper wing-bracing pylon was reduced in height, but it was made of heavier steel tubing to give more protection if the aircraft turned over. The height of the undercarriage was slightly increased to accommodate airscrews of larger diameter which would, it was hoped, improve the climb. A clamping device was fitted to the control column: this could lock the elevators to allow the pilot to clear gun stoppages more easily.
   The new design was given the Fokker type number M.14, and the first version of it had the military designation Fok. E.II. It was the first German aeroplane to be designed as a single-seat fighter: that is to say, it was not an adaptation of an existing unarmed type.
Deliveries of the new nine-cylinder Oberursel were so delayed that the first production aircraft stood for weeks on Goerries aerodrome awaiting engines. The prototype and some production machines destined for training purposes were fitted with the 80-h.p. Oberursel.
Fokker had urged Platz to cut down the M.14’s wing area to that of the Pfalz, which had proved to be appreciably faster than the Fok. E.I. The consequent reduction in the span of the E.II made it more difficult to fly. There was some reduction in the all-up weight, but by how much is not known, for available Service records confuse the E.II with the Fokker Einsitzer II - which was simply a designation used at the front for the few operational M.5K scouts.
   Fokker and Kreutzer had worked quickly to respond to the wishes of the operational units. The first Fok. E.II reached the front in July 1915; eight were operational by October. Fifteen months later, in December 1916, the last operational survivor of the type was still in service in a quiet sector of the Eastern Front.
   Contrary to expectations the climb was only a little better than that of the E.I. Fokker therefore decided to revert to wings of larger span, and the result was the most famous of the early Fokker fighters, the Fok. E.III. It had the same type number, M.14, as the E.II. The new wings spanned 9-52 m. (31 ft. 2'7 in.) against the 8-95 m. (29 ft. 4 1/2 in.) of the E.I.
   The Fok. E.III reached the Western Front in August 1915. With its increased wing span and area it was an immediate success. All lighter pilots were eager to have one as quickly as possible, their appetites whetted after the first three aircraft had displayed their qualities.
   Substantial orders, the largest he had had up to that time, were placed with Fokker by the Army. The Navy, too, pressed for several for use in their coastal defence formations. Production was of course limited by the output of the Oberursel Motor Works. To increase engine output, other firms were encouraged to produce similar, if not better, rotary engines.
   The Goebel Gandenberger Machine Factory at Frankfurt produced in a remarkably short time a modified Gnome with nine cylinders. Designated Goe.I and rated at 100 h.p., the engine performed well when test-flown in a Fok. E.III at Schwerin, but it arrived too late to alleviate the engine shortage. It was fitted to the E.III with Works No. 520, which was accepted by the Army on April 8, 1916. Allert, one of Fokker’s Works pilots, flew it for nearly three hours, climbing to 13,200 ft. in ninety minutes. The IdFlieg decided not to adopt the Goe. I, but encouraged the firm to develop an engine of twice the power.
   A similar fate befell the new Siemens Sh.I bi-rotary engine of 90 h.p., later 115 h.p. This had taken longer to develop, and when ready for production it was too late to be effective. Its unconventional nature and its late arrival prevented its use on an appreciable scale: it was experimentally installed in a few fighter aircraft. The Siemens company, well aware of Fokker’s jealousy of his competitors, had tried to have their new engine tested in a Hanuschke monoplane, possibly because they did not fancy having the tests made at Schwerin under Fokker’s direction. An experimental installation of the Sh. I was in fact made in a Fok. E.III, but it is uncertain whether it was done at Schwerin or independently by the Services at Adlershof. The results of this installation are not known.
   The prototype Fok. E.III had also been tried with an 80-h.p. Le Rhone from a captured Nieuport. Thus powered, the Fok. E.III had a better rate of climb than the standard version with the 100-h.p. Oberursel and a markedly increased ceiling. The German authorities urged the Oberursel firm to consider copying the Le Rhone with its controlled inlet and exhaust valves that reduced the loss of power at altitude. Performance at heights of 4,000 m. (13,000 ft.) had begun to become important.
   On the M.14 type the Stangensteuerung synchronizing gear was improved and the gun’s rate of fire speeded up by a modification introduced on October 20, 1915. This increased the rate of fire from 400 rounds per minute to 450-600 r.p.m. Unfortunately it also increased the risk of malfunctioning and consequent damage. Boelcke had already found out what could happen when the gear failed. On October 1, 1915, he shot his propeller away; part of the engine and mounting broke up, but he was able to force-land without harm; it took more than a week to repair the damage. Others were less fortunate. There is little doubt that not a few of the Fokkers claimed by Allied pilots in fact shot themselves down because of the failure of the Stangensteuerung. The standard Fok. E.III carried only one LMG.08. Two guns were occasionally fitted, but it was found that the additional armament reduced the rate of climb too much. Nevertheless, a number of Fok. E.IIIs, notably those used in the east, had the twin-gun installation, but carried less ammunition.
   At the end of May 1916, the Central Flying School in Britain tested a Fok. E.III that had been captured intact in April. This seems to have been E.215/15, accepted at Schwerin on March 28, 1916; its factory number may have been 480 or 512, both having been E.IIIs accepted on that date. The C.F.S. test report stated that the engine was not running full out and gave no more than 1,210 r.p.m. at most. The top speed near the ground was between 86 and 88 m.p.h.; at 11,000 ft. it was 78 m.p.h. The rate of climb at 1,000 ft. was 700 ft./min.; at 11,000 ft. it dropped to 80 ft./min. This Fok. E.III may have been the aircraft now exhibited in London’s Science Museum; this seems to be the only example of the famous Fokker fighting monoplane that survives fairly intact.
<...>
   Apart from the various experimental engine installations that have already been described, a number of experimental modifications of Fokker monoplanes were devised and tried at Adlershof. It is doubtful whether records of most of these experiments will ever be found. They included attempts simultaneously to reduce drag and improve cooling, to protect the pilot from oil and exhaust fumes, to improve the altitude performance of the engine by exploiting the ram effect of the airstream, to make the engine more accessible, and so on.
   An interesting but fruitless experiment into which Fokker was talked was the “invisible” Fok. E.I.
   The idea of making aeroplanes less visible by covering them with transparent material (in those days, cellulose plastics) was not new. One of the earliest proponents of the idea was Roesner, who originally worked as the designer for Rumpler and later became famous as the designer of the Gotha bombers and seaplanes. In 1911 he constructed an aeroplane with a covering of fine wire mesh made airtight by a cellulose solution. A year later the Austrians conducted similar experiments with an Etrich Taube. In 1913 a Russian, W. A. Lebedieff, covered a Henry Farman biplane with cellulose-plastic sheet in place of the rubberized fabric, but the covering was heavy and would not stay taut enough. Later in 1913 a Moreau parasol monoplane was exhibited at the Paris Aero-Salon with a semi-transparent covering of fine silk sandwiched between two cellulose-acetate films.
   During 1914 experiments with a Deperdussin monoplane proved that transparent coverings might make aircraft more rather than less conspicuous, owing to light reflecting from shining surfaces. Nevertheless the French tried the idea again during 1915 on a Voisin biplane, but soon gave it up.
   From 1913 onwards the German pilot and inventor A. Knubel had tried to raise interest in his scheme for a covering of highly inflammable cellulose-nitrate. He built an aeroplane of his own design and covered it with this transparent material, but a wing failure in September 1915 caused his death.
   Rumpler, too, had devised an “invisible” aeroplane, which he offered to the Army. On test, however, the cellulose sheets contracted and split with loud and alarming reports at the lower temperature experienced when airborne, and the pilot (Professor Dr. Kurt Wegener) was relieved to reach the ground safely. Similar transparent coverings were proposed by Neuber and J. Krauss but were rejected, after laboratory checks, by the Adlershof experts. They were right.
   Fokker, knowing the practice of stalking enemy planes adopted by Boelcke and Immelmann, thought it would greatly increase their chances of making surprise attacks if their Fokkers were “invisible”. People at the front, ignorant of the technical problems involved, thought so too. An experimental Fok. E.I was therefore covered with cellulose sheeting. It was complete with machine-gun and ready to go to the front after a quick test by Fokker. Fokker flew it - it was seen over Schwerin - but it never reached the front. It was quietly put aside for conversion to a normal E.I.
   A very experienced fighter pilot of this period, now a retired Colonel-General, was recently asked what specific troubles characterized the armament of the Fokker monoplanes. He replied emphatically that, although there were annoying troubles in combat, no-one minded it at the time: the main thing was that pilots had a synchronized machine-gun in a manoeuvrable aircraft: that was all that mattered.
   The aircraft’s principal shortcomings were five: the undercarriage was weak; the rate of climb and performance at altitude were poor; all versions of the Fok. E were considerably inferior to the fast little Nieuport sesquiplane; the gun or guns jammed at awkward moments, especially when the weather was too cold or moist for the hemp belts; and worst of all was the malfunctioning of the synchronizing mechanism with its attendant dangers.
   Production at Schwerin expanded satisfactorily. By the end of 1915 the works had a labour force of 430 and a staff of fifty. About 230 complete aeroplanes had been produced, apart from purely experimental machines and repairs; most of them had been monoplanes of the M.5, M.8 and M.14 types; small numbers of M.7 and M.10 biplanes had also been built. Fifty hectares of land had been rented on Goerries aerodrome for assembly and flight-acceptance purposes.
   A new arrangement brought a permanent Bauaufsicht (resident technical officer), who was empowered to accept for the Service each individual aeroplane on the spot instead of waiting for a military acceptance team to turn up to take over a whole batch of completed aircraft. The Bauaufsicht had authority to verify the results of acceptance flight tests by works pilots: these had to be checked at random by military test-pilots at the request of the Bauaufsicht. Thus the supply of aeroplanes was speeded up, and an accumulation of aircraft at the factory was prevented.
   The Fokker factory’s output for 1915 is perhaps best presented in tabular form:

Month of 1915 Aircraft accepted Aircraft supplied Remarks
   March 11 18
   June 18 18
   July 26 32 Most were biplanes
   August 36 31 Figures include 25 monoplane fighters (E.I & E.II)
   October 29 23 All were E.I or E.II
   November 32 25 Included 22 Fok. E.III and prototype E.IV
   December 18 30 Included 29 Fok. E.III

   Deliveries of Fokker E types up to July 1915 totalled seventeen Fok. E and two Fok. E.II with 80-h.p. engines for training purposes. Between May 1915 and July 1916, the Fokker works constructed at least fifty-six aircraft of the Fok. E.I type, including machines for the German Navy and for Austro-Hungary.
   Such supply documents as are available, but not necessarily complete, indicate that at least 258 aircraft of the Fok. E.III type were constructed at Schwerin between September 1915 and August 1916.
   Whatever else the Fokker monoplane fighters did, they made Fokker’s name famous: he was regarded everywhere as a master-mind. He did nothing to reflect some of this undeserved glory upon those of his collaborators to whom it was due: on the contrary, he was most anxious to leave no doubt that his was the genius that invented, designed and perfected his deadly weapons of air combat.
   In this Fokker succeeded, as far as the pilots and staff officers at the front were concerned: there was no doubt that they fully believed in his engineering mastery. During his demonstration tour at the front he had made most useful connexions and could count on getting first-hand information from the front in the shape of hints and tips; this would enable him to keep ahead of all other German aircraft manufacturers. There was, of course, nothing sinister or underhand about this: in fact, the Feldflugchef Thomsen himself encouraged direct contact and consultation with leading fighter pilots such as Boelcke, Parschau and Immelmann; a number of useful conferences took place at Schwerin and elsewhere. Fokker was liked, because he provided the weapon; he was willing to experiment and try out all hints for improvement.

J.Herris, J.Scott Fokker Aircraft of WWI. Vol.2: Eindeckers (A Centennial Perspective on Great War Airplanes 52)

Eindecker Development Notes

Fok. E.I (M5K)

  While Anthony Fokker was developing a new airframe (the M.14) specifically to mount the 100 hp Oberursel U.I engine and carry a machine gun, he also saw the opportunity to apply the same weapon system to an aircraft he already had in production (and of which he had not sold very many). Existing M5K airframes literally had Parabellum LMG14 guns and their ammunition feeds slapped onto their fuselages. Minimal internal changes were made, although the aft auxiliary fuel tank was removed to compensate for the added weight. The aluminum nose panels were re-configured to enclose the ammunition storage and empty belt container on the sides of the nose (starboard and port respectively) as well as the interrupter pushrods below the gun. About six A.IIIs were converted, the earliest known example being E 1/15, the latest E 6/15.
  The next group of M5K(MG) airframes were completed in the Schwerin factory. The general fuselage remained the same but the steel tube structure of the nose was altered to support an internal bin for the empty belts and routing of the Gestangesteuerung. The LMG08 replaced the LMG14 as the armament. The ammunition storage remained on the starboard side of the nose and the aluminum panels were refined. There is photographic evidence to suggest that the M5K wings may have had a reduced chord, but this remains to be confirmed. Eight to ten were built with this configuration, the earliest confirmed specimen being E 8/15 and the latest E 15/15.
  After these E.Is, construction of the E.IIs began and the ever-frugal Fokker streamlined production by using common components for both types. The tail unit had always been the same and homogenous undercarriages and rigging pylons had already been introduced. The big change was the adoption of the new, wider-span M.14 wings. Roughly thirty aircraft made up the balance of E.I output in 1915.
  A last gasp of ten E.Is were built in 1916, six for the Navy and four for the Army. These were still M5K airframes with M.14 wings and 80 hp Oberursel U.0 engines, but the ammunition bin was finally moved inside the fuselage and the aft fuel tank was reinstated.


Fok. E.II / III (M.14)

  The story of the Fokker M.14 is one fraught with mystery and intrigue. The difference(s) between the E.II and E.III defies simple explanation. Here are the basic facts as laid out by Fokker delivery records and the photographic evidence.
  Designed to carry the 100 hp Oberursel U.I engine as well as a machine gun, the M.14 was based on the M.5 airframe. The fuselage was lengthened and the wings/undercarriage/cockpit were moved forward to balance the heavier engine and the machine gun/ammunition. Wider-span wings were implemented and an aft auxiliary fuel tank included again. Although the prototype demonstrated by Fokker in June 1915 mounted a Parabellum LMG14, experience with the first Fokker E.Is proved the heavier LMG08 to be more suitable. All subsequent Fokker Eindeckers were armed with the latter. As with the E.I, the ammunition storage was mounted externally on the starboard side of the nose. Of the 85 Eindeckers from the first production batch, 41 were E.IIs. The other 44 were E.Is.
  The second production batch (86/15 to 121/15) was entirely M.14 airframes. About ten were marked as E.IIs when they were delivered and the rest as E.IIIs. The reason behind the change in nomenclature remains entirely unclear. The first 20 or so retained the external ammunition storage, after which the bin was moved inside the fuselage. This configuration was consistent for the rest of E.III production.
  The M.14 saga does not end with the E.III though. A final batch of twelve M.14 aircraft was built in mid-1916. These were unarmed training machines, powered by the 80 hp Oberursel U.0 engine. Photographs of these Fokkers show that the armeenummern lacked a type designation. It is apparent, however, that by this time Idflieg was using "E.II" to describe these Schuleinsitzers.
<...>

The E.II I E.III Conundrum

  As yet, no satisfactory explanation has emerged for the change of the M.14 Eindeckers from E.II to E.III. Theories regarding changes in wingspan or ammunition storage are refuted by the photographic record. An alteration in the fuel capacity is possible, but would this have warranted such a change?
  Consider some relevant documentation:
Original Fokker acceptance records (Army, Navy & Kuk)
E.I/E.II* 68
E.II 49
E.III 249
E.IV 49
Total: 415
(*no distinction was made between the first E-types to leave Schwerin)

Post-war Fokker factory production compilation (Army, Navy & Kuk)
E.I 54
E.II 12
E.III 300
E.IV 49
Total: 415

  The two factory compilations seem to be contradictory, but in fact they are not. They are looking at the numbers through two different lenses, one at the aircraft as they were leaving the factory and the other in retrospect. What these documents tell us is that at some point Idflieg decided that all armed M.14 airframes with 100 hp engines were considered E.IIIs and only unarmed M.14s with 80 hp engines were E.IIs - i.e. the final 12 Eindeckers produced as the 627-638/16 batch. One must wonder why these were not regarded as Fok. A-types.
  There are two possibilities for the original redesignation of the M.14.
  1. A physical change was made to the E.II, prompting Idflieg to apply the new E.III label. This was later deemed invalid and "E.II" came to be applied to the training machines. But why not Fok. E.V or even Fok. A.IV? Or...
  2. There was a miscommunication between Fokker and Idflieg. The latter had always intended the E.II designation to refer to a training aircraft, while Fokker was of the understanding that it was intended for the armed M.14. The first 57 Eindeckers produced (M5K and M.14) were only marked as "E...", even on the Militar dataplates. Shortly after changing the marking practice to "Fok. E.II...", the E.III designation came into use, as if Idflieg finally got wind of the mistake and advised Fokker to adopt the proper designation for an armed M.14.
  Absent official documentation, it is all conjecture. Either way, the pilots who flew the Eindeckers were primarily concerned about the power of the engine, secondarily about firepower. They invariably referred to both the E.II and E.III only as "100 ps Fokkers", making no distinction between the two.


Fokker Eindecker Descriptions from Geschichte der Flugzeugindustrie, 1918
Military Designation Fokker Type Engine & Armament Role
Fok E.I Typ M 5 80 P.S.Gnome m. 1 M.G. Kampfeinsitzer
Fok E.II Typ M 14 80 P.S.Gnome without MG. Schuleinsitzer
Fok E.III Typ M 14 100 P.S.Gnome m. 1 M.G. Kampfeinsitzer
Fok E.IV Typ M 15 160 P.S.Gnome m. 2 M.G. Kampfeinsitzer


Fokker E.I (Fokker M.5K)

  Regardless of details of the synchronized gun history, Fokker installed his synchronized machine gun into a Fokker M5K to create the Fokker fighters, five of which were ordered. However, Idflieg now established the E-type for armed monoplanes, and the five armed A.III aircraft were re-designated the Fokker E.I (military designation,- the Fokker factory called these five aircraft type M5KMG). Interestingly, the previous M5L had been a two-seater, but the E.I derived from the smaller M5K was a single-seater. All E.I fighters were powered by a seven-cylinder, 80 hp Oberursel U.0 rotary engine; 50 kg of fuel was carried in a single tank and one synchronized gun was fitted. The Oberursel U.0 used 27 kg (37 liters) of fuel and 7.3 kg (8 liters) of castor oil per hour. The high castor oil consumption was responsible for the large oil stains on these fighters after a short period of use.
  The first armed Fokker monoplane, work number 216 and military serial A.16/15, was shipped from the Fokker factory on May 30, 1915, illustrating that type designations were not rigorous at the time. Although Max Immelmann is often credited with the first victory by a Fokker E.I on August 1, 1915, Lt. Kurt Wintgens forced down a Morane-Saulnier L on July 1, 1915. However, he did not receive official confirmation of this victory, probably because the French aircraft, of MS48, landed behind French lines (both crewmen were wounded). Regardless, by July/August 1915 Fokker E.I fighters were active over the Western Front and were starting to make their presence known to their opponents.
  The key to the success of the Fokker E.I in air combat was its effective armament. Its performance and maneuverability were good for the time but were not notably better than some contemporary Allied aircraft; its synchronized gun was the essential ingredient in its accomplishments.

Fokker E.II (Fokker M.14)

  The Fokker E.II used a newer airframe derived from the M.5K airframe used by the E.I. However, then things get a bit confusing. It turns out that there were two slightly different aircraft that were designated the E.II, and they both used Fokker's new M.14 airframe.
  The first E.II was a fighter powered by a nine-cylinder, 100 hp Oberursel U.I rotary engine,- 66 kg of fuel was carried in two tanks and one synchronized gun was fitted. The more powerful Oberursel U.I used 40 kg (54 liters) of fuel and 9.1 kg (10 liters) of castor oil per hour and gave the E.II somewhat higher speed and better climb and ceiling than the E.I. This version of the E.II appears to be identical to the Fokker E.III.
  The second version of the E.II was a normally unarmed trainer powered by the 7-cylinder, 80 hp Oberursel U.0 rotary.
  From the development discussion, what appears to have happened was a miscommunication between Idflieg and Fokker at a time early in the war when aircraft designations were not yet standardized. When Idflieg ordered a follow-on fighter to the E.I, Fokker apparently thought it would be designated the E.II and the first fighters using the new M.14 aircraft were produced as the E.II, an aircraft that was basically identical to the E.III.
  However, Idflieg apparently expected the E.II to be an unarmed trainer with the next production fighter designated the E.III. Or Idflieg later changed its mind for some unknown reason. Later Idflieg documents refer to the E.II as an unarmed trainer powered by the 80 hp Oberursel - in contradiction of many photographs in this chapter of fighters identical to the E.III but designated E.II.
  Production of the Fokker airframes normally ran ahead of engine deliveries, which constrained delivery of the finished aircraft. Idflieg ordered and allocated all aero-engines to German aircraft manufacturers, and Oberursel production was not adequate to the demand at this time with the result that Fokker fighters trickled to the front.


Fokker E.III (Fokker M.14)

  The Fokker E.III used the same 100 hp Oberursel U.I rotary engine and basic airframe as the E.II, and again a single synchronized gun was fitted. Fokker's M.14 airframe may have been fitted with larger fuel and oil capacity, increasing maximum flight duration from one and a half hours to two and a half hours. These changes were not visible externally and it is not possible to determine if an Eindecker is an E.II or early E.III unless the military serial number is visible. In fact, some E.II fighters sent back to the factory for repair returned to the front marked as E.IIIs.
  By the time the E.III was introduced, Oberursel production was expanding and most Fokker Eindeckers produced were E.III models.


Stealth WWI Style - The Cellon Experiment

  The desire to reduce observability of airplanes led to trials in Germany with transparent Cellon covering in place of fabric. Cellon was tried on a number of airframes and at the Fokker company, the E.III was the subject. These photos show the result. Although it reduced the visibility of the aircraft, the airframe was still visible.
  Moreover, Cellon experiments soon revealed that it was unsuitable for covering airframes. Cellon was weak and easily torn. It absorbed water and became loose on the airframe. Finally, it was shiny and reflected light like glass.


Fokker Early E-Type Specifications
E.I Early E.I Prod. E.II E.III E.IV
Fokker Type M.5KMG M.5K M.14 M.14 M.15
Engine 80 hp Oberursel U.0 80 hp Oberursel U.0 100 hp Oberursel U.I 100 hp Oberursel U.I 160 hp Oberursel U.III
Wing Span 8.95 m 10.05 m 10.05 m 10.05 m 10.05 m
Wing Chord 1.70 m 1.80 m 1.81 m 1.81 m 1.81 m
Wing Area 14.4 m2 16 m2 16 m2 16 m2 16 m2
Length 6.95 m 6.95 m 7.25 m 7.25 m 7.5 m
Height 2.52 m 2.49 m 2.45 m 2.45 m 2.75 m
Empty Weight 358 kg 358 kg 338 kg* 399 kg 466 kg
Loaded Weight 563 kg 563 kg 498 kg* 610 kg 724 kg
Max Speed 130 km/h 130 km/h 140 km/h 140 km/h 160 km/h
Climb: 1,000 m — — — — 3 min.
2,000 m — — — — 8 min.
3,000 m — — — — 15 min.
4,000 m — — — — 25 min.
Armament 1 x Spandau 1 x LMG08/15 1 x LMG08/15 1 x LMG08/15 2 x LMG08/15
* These figures are quite light and may be for the unarmed Schuleinzitzers powered by the lighter, 7-cylinder Oberursel U.0.


Fokker Eindecker Production
Type Order Date Qty Serials
E.I/E.II May 1915 85 1-85/15
E.III July 1915 12 03.41-50, 03.53-54 (note 1)
E.II/E.III Aug. 1915 36 86-121/15
E.IV Sep.1915 6 122-127/15
E.III Oct. 1915 36 400-435/15
E.IV Nov. 1915 6 436-441/15
E.III Nov. 1915 36 601-636/15
E.IV Dec. 1915 6 637-642/15
E.IV Feb. 1916 30 160-189/16
E.III Feb.1916 60 190-249/16
E.l March 1916 4 326-329/16
E.IV Apr. 1916 20 Cancelled
E.III Apr. 1916 60 330-389/16
E.III ? 6 A.4-9 (note 2)
E.II May 1916 12 627-638/16 (note 3)
Notes:
1. For Austria-Hungarian Army, delayed by German Army and delivered February-June 1916
2. For Austria-Hungarian Navy
3. These aircraft were unarmed trainers
4. The Fokker production tabulation has 12 M.14s being built for the Navy. Of the "ex-Army" E.IIIs, the ones with known werknummern did not come from any known Army production batch, so it seems these were specifically built for the Navy.


Fokker Eindeckers in German Naval Service
Serial Type Notes
LF70 E.I Ex-Army (E.32/15?)
LF72 E.III
LF73 E.III
LF178 E.III
LF179 E.III
LF186 E.III
LF187 E.III
LF188 E.III
LF189 E Type unknown
LF190 E.III
LF191 E.I
LF192 E.I
LF193 E.I
LF194 E.I
LF195 E.I
LF196 E.III
LF208 E.I
LF210 E.IV Ex-Ar my 179/16
LF211 E.III
LF212 E.III
LF221 E.III
LF222 E.III
LF225 E.III Ex-Army 244/16
LF226 E.III Ex-Ar my 249/16
LF230 E.III
LF231 E.III


Approximate Eindecker Victories per Type
Type E.I E.II E.III E.IV
# of Victories per Type 24 30 84 87
# of Pilots with Victories 15 13 55 18
  These speculative victory tallies are based on information from Sharks Among Minnows by Norman Franks. Original compilations by Michael Zeh.
  

Pilots with 5+ Eindecker Victories
Pilot (total victories) E.I E.II E.III E.IV
Kurt Wintgens (19) 3 1 14
Oswald Boelcke (40) 2 3 1 12
Max Immelmann (15) 3 4 8
H-J Buddecke (13) 1 2 4
Otto Parschau (8) 1 5
Ernst von Althaus (9) 1 2 5
Gustav Leffers (9) 4 1
Wilhelm Frankl (19) 4 6
Walter Hohndorf (12) 2 9
Rudolf Berthold (44) 5
Max von Mulzer (10) 3 7
Hans Schuz (10) 6
Hartmuth Baldamus (18) 5


Fokker Type Designations for Eindeckers
Fokker Type Military Designation
M.5k MG E.I
M.14 E.II & E.III
M.15 E.IV
Note: The Fokker factory types M.11, M.12, and M.13 have not been identified and may have been unbuilt designs.


Fokker E-types in Turkish Service
Turkish Serial F 1 was an E.II; F 2-13 were E.IIIs (F 4 may have been an E.II). These aircraft were transferred from German Army service.


Fokker Eindecker Identification Attributes
Type Engine Armed? Notes
A.I 80 hp Oberursel U.0 (7 cyl) No Shoulder wing, Fokker model M.8
A.II 80 hp Oberursel U.0 (7 cyl) No Fokker model M.5L
A.III 80 hp Oberursel U.0 (7 cyl) One only Only Parschau's A. 16/15 was still marked as an A.III.
E.I 80 hp Oberursel U.0 (7 cyl) Yes Early types based on M.5K airframe. Later types based on M.5 airframe.
E.II 100 hp Oberursel U.I (9 cyl) Yes Fokker M.14 airframe
E.III 100 hp Oberursel U.I (9 cyl) Yes Fokker M.14 airframe. Internal changes unknown.
E.IV 160 hp Oberursel U.III (14 cyl) Yes 2 guns (3 in protos only &. one operational aircraft), based on Fokker M.15 airframe

J.Herris Fokker Aircraft of WWI. Vol.6: Foreign Service (A Centennial Perspective on Great War Airplanes 56)

Austro-Hungarian Fokker M.5L & A.III
  
  Austria obtained a number of Fokker Eindeckers in various ways.
<...>
  Two Fokker E.I aircraft, E.I 64/15 and E.I 65/15, somehow ended up with Austrian Flik 4 on the Italian Front. These aircraft were accepted by the German Army on 4 November 1915 and were shipped from the Fokker factory the next day. The aircraft were flown in combat by Flik 4 as early as 12 November. Originally flown in German markings, they were soon designated as Fokker A.III 03.51 and 03.52 in Austrian service and marked accordingly.
  In German service the designation A.III applied to the unarmed M.5L. However, the Austrians retained the A.III designation even for the armed M.5K MG, which received the military designation E.I when purchased by the German Army.
  The first known batch of Eindecker fighters officially ordered by Austria were a dozen Eindeckers ordered on 7 June 1915. The great need for Eindecker fighters on the Western Front meant the German air service refused to allow the aircraft to be exported until late in 1915. By that time, the production aircraft was the E.III, and the fighters were delivered to Austria between February and July 1916. A comparison dated 10 August 1916 between the A.III and new Brandenburg C.I stated the C.I was faster and with better climb. When new biplane fighters were delivered the remaining A.III fighters were transferred to the less demanding Eastern Front.


Fokker A.III Series 03.51-52 Specifications
Engine: 80 hp Oberursel U.O
Wing: Span 8.95 m
Wing Area 16.0 m2
General: Length 6.75 m
Height 2.88 m
Empty Weight 358 kg
Loaded Weight 563 kg
Maximum Speed: 130 km/h
Climb: 1000m 7 min
2000m 20 min
3000m 40 min
Armament: 1 MG


Fokker A.III Series 03.4 Specifications
Engine: 100 hp Oberursel U.I
Wing: Span 7.190 m
Chord 1.80 m
Wing Area 16.0 m2
General: Length 7.2 m
Height 2.4 m
Empty Weight 400 kg
Loaded Weight 615 kg
Maximum Speed: 140 km/h
Climb: 1000m 5 min
2000m 15 min
3000m 30 min
Armament: 1 MG
Note: Fokker 03.51 and 03.52 were Fokker E.l fighters in the German designation system.

O.Thetford, P.Gray German Aircraft of the First World War (Putnam)

Fokker M 5 K/MG
   Illustrating the mounting of Parabellum machine-gun for ground testing of synchronisation gear in April 1915. Only one airframe so fitted, before production as E I, and may not have been flown.


Fokker E Series
  
   One of the first German aircraft of the First World War to achieve a much publicized degree of notoriety was the E type Fokker monoplane, of which the E.III version became the main model. The success of the Fokker monoplanes, which reached its peak in the winter of 1915-16, was largely due to their being the first single-seaters equipped with a synchronized machine-gun of reasonable reliability, coupled with a good degree of maneuverability. Other inventors (such as Franz Schneider) had had the idea of a forward-firing fixed machine-gun, synchronized to fire between the airscrew blades, but Anthony Fokker was the first to convince the German authorities of the practicability of his own gear, which he had installed in one of his M 5k (A III) monoplanes previously used for unarmed reconnaissance.
   The E.I was powered with a seven-cylinder Oberursel U 0 rotary engine of 80 h.p. It was sent for operational assessment in the summer of 1915 and demonstrated by Fokker himself who - whatever his other shortcomings was undoubtedly a brilliant exhibition pilot. Oswald Boelcke subsequently flew an E.I (E 3115) and is reported to have brought down a French machine on his third sortie. The machine was also tried with equal success by Max Immelmann.
   An improved, slightly stronger version was put in hand for the main production series, and was known as the E.II. This entered service in September 1915. However, no more than twenty-three examples were built before detail alterations were made and the designation changed to E.III, the 100 h.p. Oberursel U I engine being common to both types. Boelcke's E.III was serialled 37/15. As far as can be ascertained, between 120 and 150 machines of this version were built. In April 1916 about 110 E.IIIs were operating on the Western Front. Stemming from a pre-war design that had never been intended for combat use, the Fokker monoplanes relied mainly on tactical surprise, and in this achieved much success. Their unsuspecting victims, seeing the enemy approaching from the rear, did not expect him to be able to fire through his airscrew and thereby destroy them. They were soon to learn the error of their judgment, and for a few months, during the latter half of 1915 and early 1916, the Fokkers reaped a grim harvest of unarmed, or poorly armed, Allied machines. Especially unfortunate were the British B.E. types with the observer in the front cockpit, where there was scant opportunity for defense - indeed, they became to be unhappily described as "Fokker Fodder". However, apart from the successful machine-gun installation, the shortcomings of its adversaries undoubtedly contributed towards what eventually became the Fokker legend.
   At first the Fokker monoplanes were not envisaged as an offensive weapon, but only for defense of their own two-seaters, and for this purpose were allocated - usually two aircraft - to Fl. Abt. units. At the time of introduction both Boelcke and Immelmann were with Fl. Abt. 62, and it was on 1st August 1915 that the latter scored his first victory flying an E.I, when his airfield was attacked by hostile aircraft. It was Immelmann who set the style of using the Fokker offensively by taking off on "roving commission" patrols and stalking the Allied machines that ventured across the German lines. He evolved the tactic of diving upon the enemy - from out of the sun if possible - rapidly closing for a quick burst, then back with the stick and a swift kick on the rudder-bar as the Fokker neared the vertical, producing a neatly executed reversal of direction without loss of height and readiness for another attack. It was only a matter of time for this maneuver to become known, as it is still known, as an Immelmann Turn.
   Inevitably the Fokker monoplanes were eclipsed as Allied designers evolved practical synchronizing gears (as they were literally forced to do) to neutralize the advantage of the Fokker. However, it may be said that the foundations of aerial fighting tactics were laid by the Fokker monoplanes and remained valid for many years to come.
   The E.I/E.IV monoplanes were of composite steel and wood construction, and bore an extraordinary degree of resemblance to the French Morane Saulnier monoplanes in both structure and appearance. The fuselage was completely fabricated from welded steel tube, with small brackets welded into the corners of the bays to form anchorages for the bracing cables, which were looped round them and joined with a single turnbuckle. Terminating in a horizontal knife-edge, the fuselage was completely slab sided except for two metal cowling panels at the sides of the extreme nose, which continued the circular section of the cowl for a short distance, and for a rounded top decking extending as far aft as the cockpit, also of sheet metal. The horseshoe-shaped cowling was cut away in the lower segment as a precaution against the accumulation of petrol, which might have drained through the valves and caught fire. The comma rudder and trapezoidal-shaped elevators were of the "all-moving" variety, with no fixed fin surfaces, and demanded continual vigilance from the pilot.
   Of parallel chord, the wings were angularly raked at the tips and were a quite flexible structure built on two I-section main spars. The ribs were of poplar, thin in section to afford the degree of flexibility necessary for the warp-type lateral control that was used in the design. The bracing of the wings was by four cables to each panel, anchored to an upper and lower pylon and to the forward main spar. A similar number of cables for lateral control were anchored to the rear spar but ran over pulleys at the apices of the pylons and thence into the cockpit, where they were connected to the control stick.
   The undercarriage was a somewhat complex steel-tube structure which also incorporated the lower cable anchorage pylons; the elastic-cord shock absorbers were attached to the tops of the main vertical members inside the fuselage. An inverted pylon of light-gauge steel tube supported the tailskid and also served as a pivot for the lower extremity of the rudder.
  
  
Description: Single-seat escort fighting scout.
Manufacturer: Fokker Flugzeug-Werke G.m.b.H. (Fok.).
   E.I E.II E.III
Power Plant: 80 hp Oberursel 100 hp Oberursel 100 hp Oberursel
Dimensions:
   Span 8.53m ( 28 ft.) 9m (29.5 ft.) 10m (32 ft. 8 in.)
   Length 6.76m (22 ft. 2 in.) 7.3m (23.9 ft.) 7.16m (23 ft. 6 in.)
   Height 2.89m (9 ft. 6 in.) 2.89m (9 ft. 6 in.) 2.29m (7 ft. 10 in.)
Weights:
   Empty 357.4 kg ( 788 lb.) 399 kg ( 878 lb.) 398.2 kg (878 lb.)
   Loaded 662 kg (1,239 lb.) 560 kg (1,232 lb) 608.7 kg ( 1,342 lb.)
Performance:
   Max speed 131.9 kph ( 82 mph ) 140.8 kph ( 87.5 mph) 140.8 kph ( 87.5 mph)
   Ceiling 3,048m (10,000 ft.) 4,114.8m (13,500 ft.) 4,114.8m (13,500 ft.)
Armament: one forward firing one forward firing one forward firing
   7.92mm machine gun 7.92mm machine gun 7.92mm machine gun

W.Green, G.Swanborough The Complete Book of Fighters

FOKKER E I (M 5K/MG) Germany

   Flown in the late spring of 1914, the M 5 (the prefix letter signifying Militar) was a single-seat monoplane of mixed construction, with a welded steel-tube fuselage, wooden wings and fabric skinning. It was built in two versions, the M 5L (assigned the military designation A II) with long-(lang) and the M 5K (A III) with short-(kurz) span wings. Several were supplied privately to Prussian officers and two (A IIs) to the Austro-Hungarian Luftfahrttruppen. One M 5K was fitted with a DWM Parabellum MG 14 with Fokker’s so-called Stangensteuerung (push-rod control) synchronising the weapon with the propeller. This was successfully demonstrated to the Idflieg (Inspectorate of Flying Troops) as the M 5K/MG and was ordered in series by the Heeresverwaltung as the E I. The more reliable air-cooled version of the Maxim LMG 08/15 gun was standardised and the E I was powered by an 80 hp Oberursel U O (Gnome copy) seven-cylinder rotary engine. Production deliveries commenced in June 1915, a total of 54 aircraft being built, of which the majority were assigned to the Kampf-Einsitzer-Kommando (Single-seat Battle Command). Some E Is went to various Feldflieger-Abteilungen, six were ordered by the Marine-Landflieger and nine were assigned to the Austro-Hungarian Luftfahrttruppen. Deliveries of the E I were completed in June 1916.

Max speed, 81 mph (130 km/h).
Range, 124 mis (200 km) at 68 mph (110 km/h).
Service ceiling, 9,840 ft (3 000 m).
Empty weight, 789 lb (358 kg).
Loaded weight, 1,241 lb (563 kg).
Span, 29 ft 4 1/3 in (8,95 m).
Length, 22 ft 1 3/4 in (6,75 m).
Height, 7 ft 10 1/2 in (2,40 m).
Wing area, 155 sq ft (14,40 m2).


FOKKER E II & III (M 14) Germany

   Derived from the M 5K fighting scout, the M 14 was, in its initial form at least, an unarmed tuitional aircraft with 10.76 sq ft (1,00 m2) more wing area and a marginally longer fuselage. Some local structural reinforcement and minor changes were introduced in the forward fuselage decking, the upper wing bracing pylon and the undercarriage, and the 80 hp Oberursel engine of the E I was retained. Twelve were ordered by the Heeresverwaltung under the designation E II. In the event, 47 additional E IIs were also to be built, with a similar armament to that of the E I, the first three of these being delivered in July 1915 and 13 more following in August before the first unarmed examples (six delivered in each of September and October) were taken into the inventory. The armed E IIs were re-engined with the 100 hp Oberursel U I nine-cylinder rotary during repair or overhaul, reappearing in Fokker’s delivery lists as E IIIs when redelivered to the Fliegertruppen. The designation E III was, in fact, that applied to new-build M 14 airframes fitted with the U I rotary from the outset, improved synchronising gear being provided for the LMG 08/15 gun. Of 258 aircraft built from the outset as E IIIs, 221 were delivered to the Fliegertruppen, 19 were supplied to Marine-Landflieger, 12 were received by the Austro-Hungarian Luftfahrttruppen and the remaining six went to the Austro-Hungarian Navy. The following data relate to the E III.

Max speed, 87 mph (140 km/h).
Range, 149 mis (240 km) at 74 mph (120 km/h).
Service ceiling, 11,810 ft (3 600 m).
Empty weight, 880 lb (399 kg).
Loaded weight, 1,345 lb (610 kg).
Span, 31ft 2 4/5 in (9,52 m).
Length, 23 ft 7 1/2 in (7,20 m).
Height, 7 ft 10 1/2 in (2,40 m).
Wing area, 165.77 sq ft (15,40 m2).

P.Grosz, G.Haddow, P.Shiemer Austro-Hungarian Army Aircraft of World War One

Fokker A.Ill Series 03.4

  Weeks before German frontline units received the new Fokker E.I (M 5KMG) fighter armed with the revolutionary synchronized machine gun, the LFT knew of its existence and had ordered 12 monoplane fighters on 7 June 1915, followed by further purchase orders totalling 33 fighters. Due to Western Front demands, the German air service refused to grant export permission until late 1915, when the sale of 12 Fokker E.III (M 14) fighters was approved. LFT acceptance of the 12 E.III fighters, designated A.III 03.41 to 03.50, 03.53, and 03.54, began in February 1916 and ended in July, just as the Fokker monoplane fighter was in process of being replaced on the Western Front.41 Aircraft 03.41 and 03.42 were powered by the French-built 100 hp Gnome rotary engine, the remainder by the 100 hp Oberursel.
  It should be noted that at the time when the 12 E.III fighters were under construction in November 1915, two Fokker E.I fighters were already operational with Flik 4 on the Italian Front. The two fighters, numbered E.I 64/15 and 65/15 (80 hp Oberursel engine), had been accepted by the German air service on 4 November 1915 and left the Fokker factory the next day. The question of whether they arrived at Flik 4 directly from Schwerin or were diverted from a German squadron on the Eastern Front remains open. Initially Flik 4 pilots flew the E.I fighters in their German markings, until the two fighters were designated A.III 03.51 and 03.52 respectively.
  Oberleutnant Hassan Riza Effendi Pieler flew the first recorded Fokker A.III combat sortie on 12 November 1915 to intercept a flight of Caproni bombers attacking the Flik 4 airfield at Aisovizza, but a jammed gun forced him to retire.
  Hauptmann Mathias Bernath, CO of Flik 4 flying 03.51 (ex-E.I 64/15), was credited with the first Austro-Hungarian single-seat fighter victory when he downed an Italian Maurice Farman biplane near San Lorenzo di Mossa on 25 November 1915. On 18 February 1916, a Caproni squadron on its way to bomb Laibach (Ljubljana) was intercepted by Hauptmann Heinrich Kostrba (03.51) and Bernath (03.42). They both received credit for downing Caproni C.478 at 0845 hours. Kostrba obtained his second victory by shooting down an Italian Caudron at 0925 hours. Twenty-five minutes later, Kostrba, Oberleutnant Ludwig Hautzmayer (03.52), Fahnrich Max Brociner (03.41), and a two-seater from Flik 8 shared a victory over Caproni C.703 returning from the raid. Three further victories were recorded by Fokker A.III fighters of Flik 19: Oberleutnant Maximilian Perini (03.42) shot down a Voisin for his first victory on 10 May 1916; Stabsfeldwebel Stefan Huzjan (03.52), a Voisin for his second victory; Oberleutnant Hautzmayer (03.42), a Caudron for his third victory. No victories were recorded by the Fokker A.III fighters assigned to Fliks 8, 12, and 28 on the Isonzo Front. Obviously so few fighters had a negligible impact on the air war, particularly since pilots were prohibited from following their prey over the lines to prevent the synchronization mechanism from falling into enemy hands. Moreover, the A.III was rapidly becoming obsolete. An LFT summary dated 10 August 1916, comparing the A.III with the new Brandenburg C.I, praised the latter as being superior in both speed and climb. With the introduction of the new Brandenburg and Albatros biplane fighters in November 1916, the Fokker A.III was shifted to the less-active Eastern Front, serving with Fliks 1, 8, 9, 13, 18, 25, and 29 until the remaining two or three machines were withdrawn to end their career as single-seat trainers.

Fokker A.III Series 03.4
Engine: 100 hp Oberursel
Wing: Span Upper 10.04 m (32.94 ft)
Chord Upper 1.80 m (5.91 ft)
Total Wing Area 16.0 sq m (172 sqft)
General: Length 7.20 m (23.62 ft)
Height 2.40 m (7.87 ft)
Empty Weight 400 kg (882 lb)
Loaded Weight 615 kg (1356 lb)
Maximum Speed: 140 km/hr (87 mph)
Climb: 1000m (3,281 ft) in 5 min
2000m (6,562 ft) in 15 min
3000m (9,843 ft) in 30 min

Fokker A.III Series 03.51-52
Engine: 80 hp Oberursel
Wing: Span Upper 8.95 m (29.36 ft)
Total Wing Area 16.0 sq m (172 sq ft)
General: Length 6.75 m (22.15 ft)
Height 2.88 m (9.45 ft)
Track 2.00 m (6.56 ft)
Empty Weight 358 kg (789 lb)
Loaded Weight 563 kg (1241 lb)
Maximum Speed: 130 km/hr (81 mph)
Climb: 1000m (3,281 ft) in 7 min
2000m (6,562 ft) in 20 min
3000m (9,843 ft) in 40 min

E.Hauke, W.Schroeder, B.Totschinger Die Flugzeuge der k.u.k. Luftfahrtruppe und Seeflieger 1914-1918

00. Versuchs- und Beuteflugzeuge (Опытные и трофейные самолеты)
03.41 - 03.50 Fokker A.III (Type M 14) Ob/Gn 100
03.51 - 03.52 Fokker A.III (Type E.I) Ob/Gn 80
03.53 - 03.54 Fokker A.III (Type M 14) Ob/Gn 100

Kampfflugboote
A I Type Fokker E.III (später A 4) Ob/Gn 100
A II Type Fokker E.III (später A 5) Ob/Gn 100
A III Type Fokker E.III (später A 6) Ob/Gn 100
A IV Type Fokker E.III (später A 7) Ob/Gn 100
A V Type Fokker E.III (später A 8) Ob/Gn 100
A VI Type Fokker E.III (später A 9) Ob/Gn 100